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Abstract
The collapse of  Suharto’s New Order is a starting point of  the quest of
religious identity for Indonesian Muslims. A lot of radical groups are
founded under the umbrella of liberty and democracy. However, many of
them have destroyed the structure of democracy and multicultural society.
Conflicts of Maluku (and Poso) (1999-2003) are the best local context
of how religious groups (Muslims and Christians) fighted severely in the
name of God. The conflict is also a good case to understand the weakening
of  state and the involvements of  military (para-military) forces in
instigating the conflicts, which impacted to thousands people killed, and
destroyed the ethnic and religious harmony in the region. This paper will
analyse the conflicts of Maluku and compare it to other religious conflicts
in Poso, Central Sulawesi and ethnic conflicts in West Kalimantan,
Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines. I argue the growth of  local
nationalism and unstability of States in Southeast Asian regions brings
the rise of  civil society and paramilitary forces, which challenges the entities
of  harmony, peace and multiculturalism in the region.
Keywords: religious identity, jihad, conflict,  muslim-Christian relation,
Maluku.
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A. Islamic Forces after the New Order
The Muslim-Christian conflict in the Maluku islands in Indonesia,
which began in 1999 has been a much under-reported civil war, despite
the fact that over 10,000 people were killed and over half a million
rendered homeless. This essay will examine how the conflict developed
after the setting up of the Java-based radical Muslim paramilitaries of
the Laskar Jihad (holy warriors) in the Malukus. The arrival of  the
Laskar Jihad was itself a response to developments in national politics
and assertions by radical Muslims that Muslim-cleansing was taking
place in Maluku.
This essay will argue that religious segregation became much
more pronounced within a year of the start of the conflict, as mixed
Muslim and Christian regions in Maluku were destroyed in the fighting.
The conflict essentially forced the respective communities to take refuge
in their own separate areas. The Laskar Jihad will be seen as a type of
premanism, though it is in this case maintained by a religious creed.
Lindsey’s analysis of  premanism is crucial to our understanding of  the
conflict. He shows how certain elites employed vigilante groups to
inflate the conflict and how they gained economic privileges as a result.1
Analyses by Aditjondro and Tomagola, in examining the relations
between the central elite and the preman-laskar, confirm Lindsey’s
assessment that both state and privately-funded premanism existed.
According to Lindsey, premanism is:
derived from the Dutch for ‘free man’ and originally used to refer to
irregular or demobilised soldiers … the term [preman] came to mean
bandit and then gangster or, more commonly stand-over man. At
times the term has overlapped with the jago (literally, ‘fighting cock’),
the village ‘tough’ of ancient tradition who in an urban context became
a gang boss; the rampok bandits; and the laskar (militia or irregular
forces).2
–––––––––––––––––
1 Tim Lindsey, “The Criminal State: Premanisme and the New Indonesia”, in
Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (eds), Indonesia Today: Challenges of  History,
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001).
2 Ibid., p.284.
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Premanism has been evident in recent years in Indonesia as part
of a trend towards the establishment of Muslim paramilitaries,
especially after the demise of  the Suharto regime in 1998. Lindsey’s
concepts of ‘state’ and ‘private’ premanism underlie the analysis that
follows. This premanism explains the genesis, development and
sustenance of  the conflict in the Malukus. Indeed, it was the Laskar
Jihad militia group that played a prominent role in the conflict, and it
is the contention of this essay that outsider forces were responsible in
large part for the scale and sustenance of the violence in Maluku.
This essay will begin with an examination of the rise of the Jihad
movement in Indonesia following the fall of the Suharto regime in
1998, as well as the emergence and role of the radical Muslim
paramilitary group, the Laskar Jihad, in the Maluku conflict. It will
then examine the responses of  various actors in the conflict, namely,
the national security forces, the Muslims, the Christians, the NGOs
and local government, and finally, the central government. The essay
then ends with a discussion of the post 9/11 Jihad movement in
Maluku, following the disbandment of the Laskar Jihad, and how this
has left a legacy for local Ambonese in the form of  more radicalised
Muslim groups. It concludes with an analysis of  the challenges that
the central government and the local community faces.
B. Setting the Context: the Early Beginnings of Muslim-
Christian Conflict
Islam had become established by the middle of the fifteenth
century in Maluku through the influence of  Muslim traders.  The first
Islamised regions were Leihitu and Hatuhaha in the kingdoms of
Ternate and Tidore, where the local people had both economic and
political reasons to cooperate.3 From the end of the fifteenth to the
middle of  the seventeenth centuries, the Muslim kingdoms of  Ternate
and Tidore then spread Islam to the rest of  the Ambonese islands.
–––––––––––––––––
3 Richard Z Leirissa, Maluku dalam Perjuangan Nasional Indonesia, (Jakarta:
Lembaga Sejarah Fakultas Sastra Universitas Indonesia, 1975), p. 7.
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Islamisation continued more gradually after the coming of the
Portuguese and Dutch.4
Cooley has observed that the advent of  Islam resulted in changes
in the local culture. In the indigenous marriage system, for instance,
the required dowry was a human head as a symbol of  individual prowess.
This was later altered to rings, jewelry and other items prescribed under
Islamic law.5 Islamisation was challenged by the Christianisation of
Malukan communities by the Portuguese when they held sway in the
islands, from 1512 to 1605. The Portuguese first brought Catholicism
to Northern Maluku, but encountered strong resistance from the
Muslims there. They subsequently succeeded in Christianising elites
in Central Maluku, where there was less resistance due to the fact that
the region had not been fully Islamised.
When the Portuguese first arrived in Maluku, the Muslim sultans
welcomed them and the trade they brought. However, armed clashes
soon broke out between the Muslims on the one hand, and the
Portuguese and, later their local Christian converts, on the other, over
economic and religious issues.6
Lestaluhu has detailed the history of  these clashes.7 The first
was the Hitu War (1520-1605) between Malukan Muslims and
Portuguese and Malukan Christians. The Muslim- Christian clashes
continued until the coming of the Dutch in 1605. Soon after the Dutch
arrival, some 16,000 Ambonese were baptised in the Leitimor and Lease
islands in 1605.8 The Dutch were to stay on for more than three hundred
years until 1942. The Dutch colonial government brought the
Protestant religion, which made significant inroads into the central
part of Maluku. This was aided by the fact that Dutch policy favored
–––––––––––––––––
4 F.L. Cooley, “Persentuhan Kebudayaan di Maluku Tengah 1475-1675”, in
Paramita R. Abdurrachman, R.Z. Leirissa and C.P.F. Luhulima (eds), Bunga Rampai
Sejarah Maluku (1), (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian Sejarah Maluku, 1973), p. 120.
5 Ibid., p. 121.
6 Leirissa, Maluku.
7 Maryam RL. Lestaluhu, Sejarah Perlawanan Masyarakat Islam terhadap Imperialisme
di Daerah Maluku, (Bandung: PT Al Maarif, 1988).
8 Richard Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatist, (Leiden:  KITLV Press,
1990), p. 18.
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Christians in gaining access to education and lower administrative
positions in the colonial government. Chauvel described the
discriminatory policy of the Dutch government toward Muslims as
follows:
After some hesitation, and the request from the Christian village leaders
from Leitimor in 1607, the VOC [Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, Dutch
East India Company] adopted the policy that Christianity was seen as
a means to promote the loyalty of the population to the Christian
rulers. The VOC also attempted, with limited success, to curb the process
of  Islamisation. Together with the destruction of  the Ambonese Islamic
‘states’ and the elimination of the Moslem elite as independent political
actors, this meant that the Moslem community was relegated to a
subordinate position in colonial society compared with their Christian
compatriots.9
However, they could not have foreseen the long-term
consequences of  this type of  policy. It resulted in the division of  the
local community along religious lines and laid the basis for the conflict
between Muslims and Christians that has continued to the present-
day.
C. The Rise of the Jihad Movement in Indonesia
In a tabligh akbar (mass religious meeting) of  the Forum Komunikasi
Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama’ah (FKAWJ, or Sunni Communication Forum)
in Solo, Central Java, on 14 February 1999, about a month after the
Ambon conflict broke out, its leader, Ja’far Umar Thalib, stated that:
Muslims must be alert to the threat from Muslims’ foes and the
separatists, who tend to tyrannise the Muslim religious minority. Muslims
have an obligation to get behind an Islamic government, which is headed
by a pious Muslim man. If the kafir (infidel) is to lead the government,
based on the fatwa (guidance) of Syaikh bin Baz [Syaikh Abdulaziz Bin
Baz], Muslims will have to battle against him/ her.10
Thalib’s perspective here was clearly biased against the Christians,
as he gave a one-sided elucidation of the teachings of the Salafy Arab
–––––––––––––––––
9 Ibid, p. 20.
10 “Apel Siaga Umat Islam”, Salafy, No. 30, 1999 (44).
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cleric, Syaikh Abdulaziz Bin Baz11 (d. 13 May 1999), a Grand Mufti of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Head of the Council of Ulama in
Saudi Arabia. For Thalib, Syaikh Abdulaziz was one of  the most
outstanding figures, not only as a Salafy religious teacher, but also
someone with the international political connections that would help
further Thalib’s own agenda in Indonesia. The Salafy (or Salafi) represent
a reformed Islamic ideology in search of  Islamic purification by
returning to the Qur’an and the Sunnah. The Salafyst (reformist) thinkers
base their teaching on that of Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani (d. 1896), Abu
al-Ala Maududi (1903-1949), and the leader of the Muslim Brothers,
Hasan al-Banna (1906-1964).12
To understand the developments of  the Jihad movement in
Indonesia, it is important to examine Thalib’s background and that of
the FKAWJ. Thalib was born on 29 December 1961 in an Arab family
at Malang, East Java. Thalib’s father was an advocate of  the al-Irsyad
movement, an organization of the sayyid community during the colonial
period. After graduating from the Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies
(LIPIA) Jakarta, a higher institute sponsored by the government of
Saudi Arabia, Thalib went to the Maududi Islamic Institute in Pakistan,
under the sponsorship of the DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia,
Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia), a missionary organization
established by Muhammad Natsir (d. 1993) in 1967.
Whilst in Pakistan, Thalib was involved with the Afghan mujahidin
in their Jihad or holy war against the Soviet Union, which had invaded
Afghanistan in 1979 and spent the 1980s battling to control the country.
As a volunteer fighter, Thalib was attached to one of the factions led
by an Afghan assistant professor of  theology who graduated from
–––––––––––––––––
11 Syaikh (or Sheikh) Abdulaziz Bin Baz had been a leading figure in the Saudi
Arabian government for about fifty years. He came to prominence as a judge of the Al-
Kharj region in the 1950s and ultimately rose to the highest position among Muslim
scholars in Arabia with influence over the Muslim world. He became the Grand Mufti,
who was responsible for giving religious decrees on certain issues from family problems
to politics until his death in 1999. See the website set up in appreciation of  Bin Baz’s
fatawa (religious decrees) and his life: http://www.ibnbaz.org.sa, accessed 20 February
2003.
12 Olivier Roy, The Failure of  Political Islam, trs.. Carol Volk, (Boston: Harvard
University Press, 1994), p. 34.
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Mecca. He was associated with Abdul Rabb Rassul Sayyaf ’s Saudi-
supported organization, the Ittihad-I Islami (Islamic Union), Burhanuddin
Rabbani’s party, the Jami’at-I Islami (Islamic Association) and Gulbudin
Hekmatyar’s group, the Hizb-I Islami (Islamic Party) before becoming
devoted to the Jama’at al-Da’wa ila al-Qur’an wa Ahl-i Hadith (the
Association of  Propagation toward Qur’an and the Followers of
Hadith), a Salafy faction led by Saudi cleric, Maulawi Jamilurrahman
(d. 1991).13 From these experiences, Thalib formulated his own ideas
as to how the principles of Jihad could be applied to the context of
politics in Indonesia.14
Thalib returned to Jakarta in 1989 and taught at the al-Irsyad
pesantren (Islamic boarding school) in Salatiga, Central Java. However,
Thalib continued to study Salafy doctrines in 1991 under an Yemeni
cleric, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi’I, one of  the spiritual teachers of  today’s
conservative Islamist Islah party and the Salafi-Wahhabi movement in
Yemen.15 Thalib also studied Salafy doctrine in Yemen under Salafi-
Wahabi teachers during his hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca): each of  them
(Muhammad Nasr al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999), Abdulaziz Abdullah bin
Baz (1912-1999) and Rabi’ ibn Hadi ‘Umar al-Madkhali) were prominent
figures giving fatwa (guidance) in support of the tabligh akbar and later
the Jihad in Indonesia, covering an assortment of issues from politics
to war against Christians.16
Returning from Yemen, Thalib established a pesantren and a Salafy
community called the Jama’ah Ihya al-Sunnah (the Community to
Establish the Prophet’s Teachings) in Kaliurang, Yogyakarta in 1994.
He recruited students from secular universities and based his teachings
–––––––––––––––––
13 Noorhaidi Hasan, “Faith and Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era
of  Transition in Indonesia”, Indonesia, April 2002, 73 (145-169); Oliver Roy, The Failure
of Political Islam.
14 As a Salafy propagator, Thalib argued that Muslims should not get involved
in politics. However, Thalib’s Jihad and religious rallies were supported by elements in
the Islamic political elite and impacted on national politics. Therefore, this thesis argues
that Thalib’s Jihad movement had non-electoral political motives. Because, under Salafy
teaching and tradition, Thalib pressured his Salafy followers not to join political parties.
15 Noorhaidi Hasan, “Faith and Politics”, p. 153.
16 Ibid, p. 154.
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on canonical books written by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Ahmad
ibn Taymiyyah and the disciple of  Ibn Taymiyyah, Muhammad Abu
Bakr ibn Qayyim. Thalib’s study in Yemen and Saudi Arabia gave him
religious legitimacy and a link to financial sources, which were the
principle means of  support for Thalib’s Jihad in Indonesia.
Thalib transformed the Ihya al-Sunnah into the Forum Komunikasi
Ahlussunnnah Wal Jama’’h (FKAWJ) in 1998, after the fall of  the Suharto
regime provided the democratic space for political Islam to emerge
from the constraints imposed during the New Order period. He also
shifted his focus from non-political Islamic missionary activities to
political activism. The FKAWJ was a modern organization with an
executive board, led by Ayib Safruddin, a graduate of  the Psychology
Faculty at the University of Muhammadiyah, Surakarta, Central Java,
and by its secretary, Ma’ruf  Bahrun, an engineering graduate from
Haluoleo University, Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi. Thalib himself  was
the chief of the advisory board (supreme religious board), which had
authority over the central executive board.
The advisory board was comprised of  fifty-four Salafi-Wahhabi
teachers, who had studied at Middle Eastern universities, such as the
King Muhammad Ibn Saud and Medina Islamic Universities.17 The
FKAWJ’s members were mostly low-income earners, university
students or Muslims who had been laid-off as a result of the financial
and economic crises of  1997-8. The FKAWJ grew very rapidly in a
very short time. It established twelve pesantrens throughout Indonesia,
each with memberships of around forty thousand people. These later
formed the core components of  the militia organization, the Laskar
Jihad.
Apart from deep alienation over the financial and economic crises,
Thalib also benefited from the debates surrounding national politics,
in the period between the formation of  the FKAWJ at the tabligh akbar
in Solo in February 1999 and the declaration of  the Laskar Jihad at
another tabligh akbar in January 2000 in Yogyakarta. During this period,
the FKAWJ, along with other Muslim activists and organizations, not
only had called for a Jihad to Ambon, but also professed that it was
–––––––––––––––––
17 Ibid, p. 158.
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compulsory for Muslims vote for the only Muslim presidential candidate
in the 1999 elections. They wanted Bachruddin Jusuf  Habibie to
continue as president after the 1999 elections, rather than Megawati
Soekarnoputri or Abdurrahman Wahid, both of  whom they claimed
would be haram (forbidden) for Muslims to vote for. Megawati as a
woman candidate was unacceptable and Wahid was regarded as a kafir
(infidel) due to the liberal and eclectic form of  Islam that he practiced.
Wahid also supported ethnic and religious minority groups, rather than
side with the majority modernist Muslims. Wahid was in fact opposed
to some of the main Islamic political movements, such as the Ikatan
Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI, the Association of Indonesian
Muslim Intellectuals), on the grounds that Islam and politics should
not mix.
Thalib argued that:
Habibie was the only candidate who had Islamic views, in contrast
with Wahid (PKB) … and Megawati (PDI-P) who were secular party
leaders, who competed to assure salibis (Crusaders), Zionists and Chinese
conglomerates that they were able to devote themselves to the purpose
of  stopping the dangers of  the Islamic sectarians.18
Thalib not only backed Habibie in his presidential candidature
with the support of  a religious fatwa from Wahhabi religious teachers
from Arabia, but also argued that the Ambon conflict had also led to a
general condemnation of the Indonesian military forces and of the
government’s performance due to their perceived failure to protect
Muslims against alleged ethnic cleansing by Christians. After the
formation of  the Wahid government, Thalib claimed that it was the
right time for Muslims to fight against not only the Christians in Maluku
and also against Wahid’s government.
On 30 January 2000, the FKAWJ had their second tabligh akbar
in Kridosono, Yogyakarta and declared their Jihad in Maluku. According
to Thalib, ‘The tabligh akbar’s Jihad declaration was a response to the
arrogance of  President Abdurrahman Wahid in disregarding the cry of
Malukan Muslims who were hurting as a consequence of the horrible
–––––––––––––––––
18 Salafy, no. 33, 1999, p. 5.
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crusade.’19 This was the official declaration of  the formation of  the
militia organization, the Laskar Jihad Ahlussunnah Wal Jama’ah (the Holy
Warriors of  the Sunnah Followers and the Prophet’s Community), later
called the Laskar Jihad. Following this declaration, the FKAWJ sent a
delegation of  seven members to Maluku on 12 February 2000 to gather
evidence of the involvement of the Malukan Protestant Church (GPM)
and the Catholic Church of Ambon in the alleged ethnic cleansing of
Muslims.
The Laskar Jihad also invited Indonesian Muslims to join the
Jihad to Maluku. They opened Jihad recruitment offices in the major
cities in Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi, and also sought financial support
from individual Muslims in mosques, markets, restaurants, streets and,
more significantly, from high profile national figures and conglomerates
which used to be close to the discredited Suharto regime.20  During
their Jihad operation, the Laskar Jihad claimed to have received financial
support from many ordinary people, including individual donations
from Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Europe, the USA and Australia,21 and, from
Muslim political parties in Libya, the Philippines, Afghanistan and
Pakistan.22  However, there was little transparency as to the identity
of these donors, or how they were used to finance the activities of the
Laskar Jihad.23
–––––––––––––––––
19 Ja’far Umar Thalib, Laskar Jihad Ahlussunnah Wal Jama’ah Mempelopori Perlawanan
terhadap Kedurjanaan Hegemoni Salibis-Zionis Internasional di Indonesia, (Yogyakarta: DPP
Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah, 2001), p. 14.
20 Some speculative analyses conclude that financial support come from elites in
the Indonesian military forces, under Commander-in-chief  Wiranto, for example from
Djaja Suparman and Sudrajat; and, from some parliamentary members and politicians
during and after the Wahid government. However, it is still difficult to prove these
allegations. An interview with Sidney Jones, Jakarta, end of  August 2002 and Canberra,
January 2003.
21 Interviews with a FKAWJ staff  member, Yogyakarta, early September 2002.
22 Kirsten E. Schulze, “Laskar Jihad and the Conflict in Ambon”, The Brown
Journal of  World Affairs, Vol. IX, issue 1, 2002, p. 61.
23 Interview with a FKAWJ staff  member, Dogelan, Yogyakarta, early September
2002. Besides, the sources of the overseas donations were difficult to track down after
the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001 attack, after which tight restrictions
were put in place to prevent support for terrorism in South and Southeast Asia. An
interview with a FKAWJ staff  member, Dogelan, Yogyakarta, early September 2002.
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The Laskar Jihad recruited many unemployed Muslims, mostly
from Java, South Sulawesi, Sumatra and Kalimantan, a number of
university students, a few university graduates from secular universities,
some veterans of the Afghanistan war and a small number from Islamic
universities. Recruitment took place as early as February 1999, after
the declaration of  Jihad by the FKAWJ and other Muslim organisations.
The Laskar Jihad also held a mass rally at the Senayan Stadium on 6
April 2000, attended by about 50,000 Muslims, including a number of
high profile political figures, such as: Amin Rais, the president of the
Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, National Mandate Party); Hamzah Haz,
the president of  the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, the United
Development Party) and later Vice-President of  Indonesia; Yusril Ihza
Mahendra, the president of  Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB); Ahmad
Sumargono, who led the radical organization, the Komite Solidaritas Islam
(KISDI); prominent Malukan Muslims such as Ustaz Ali Fauzy; and
the former commander-in-chief  of  the Pattimura military command,
Brig. Gen. (ret.) Rustam Kastor.24
Although the Wahid government opposed the rally, elements in
the Indonesian security forces supported it. Jakarta police officer, Lt.
Col. (Police) Said Agil, confirmed the involvement of  security forces
and argued that this rally was therefore better organized and orderly
compared to other rallies.25 Elements in the political elite, in particular
those involved in the Poros Tengah (Central Axis) alliance of  Muslim
political parties, who were disappointed with Wahid government’s
policies and its lukewarm support for the implementation of  Muslim
law, also supported the rally.26
The Poros Tengah caucus was initiated by Amin Rais of  PAN, and
other Islamic political parties, such as PPP, PBB, Partai Keadilan (PK)
and Partai Nahdlatul Ummat (PNU), which collectively only received a
small percentage of  the vote in the 1999 elections. They wanted to
unite in order to increase their political bargaining power against the
–––––––––––––––––
24 ICG, Indonesia: the Search for Peace in Maluku. ICG Asia Report No. 31, 8
February 2002, p.6.
25 Republika, 8 April 2000.
26 “Menebar Virus Dari Silang Monas”, Xpos, No. 02/ III, 9-27 January 2000
(5-6).
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larger political parties, such as the PDI-P, Party of  Golongan Karya (PGK)
and PKB. The Poros Tengah successfully organized support from
parliamentary members for Amburrahman Wahid’s candidature as
against Megawati Soekarnoputri for the reason that ‘Islam’ was against
having a woman president. They claimed that Wahid was the only
candidate able to accommodate the frictions among Indonesians.
However, they were soon to be disappointed. Wahid as president
failed to accommodate the various Muslim factions. Differences soon
led to the departure of the representatives of Muslim parties from his
cabinet. Thus, the tabligh akbar in Jakarta represented various disaffected
Muslim interests and was organized to challenge the Wahid
government. The momentum of the Jihad movement, with the evident
significant political support from Jakarta elites, resulted in an increase
in the confidence of  local Ambonese Muslims. This in turn led to the
Christians responding by seeking national as well as international
intervention in the conflict.
The following section examines the roles of the various actors
in the conflict, namely the national security forces, the Muslims, the
Christians, NGOs and local government, and finally, the central
government.
D. The Response of the National Security Forces
During the first phase of the conflict, the Christians held the
upper hand. During this phase, Muslims sought the support of their
Muslim brethren in Java and other parts of Indonesia, holding numerous
Muslim rallies to declare the importance of a holy war against the
Christians. As a result of  the support of  the Laskar Jihad, the Muslims
were able, during the later stages of the conflict, to reverse their
fortunes and gain the upper hand, regaining the Muslim areas that the
Christians had taken during the initial phase of the conflict.
This later phase began in May 2000, after the Laskar Jihad came
to Ambon with its first group of 3,000 members, equipped with
standard military weapons.27 The Laskar Jihad shifted the pattern of
–––––––––––––––––
27 Before the Jihad paramilitary deployment to Ambon, Ja’far Umar Thalib claimed
that about 2000 of the Jihad core members obtained military training in Munjul village,
Bogor, West Java under the support of  elements in the TNI, Afghan veterans and
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the conflict as a result of  their access to small arms from Java. Not
surprisingly, the Laskar Jihad’s arrival had an immediate impact, with a
rapid upsurge of violence as soon as they stepped ashore. On 16-17
May 2000 in the Batumerah-Mardika area, in front of the Pos Kota
(city post office) in A.M. Sangaji Street, 13 people were killed and 50
people were injured. At the same time, from 16 to 18 May 2000, the
conflict also spread to Ahuru and Karang Panjang, leaving 17 people
dead. On 20 May 2000, 13 people were killed in Laha. Most of the
victims were Christians.28  By the end of  May 2000, the Maranatha
Church was desperate enough to seek international intervention by
appealing to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to send a
peacekeeping force to Maluku.29
The violence continued throughout June 2000. In response, the
Christians founded the Front Kedaulatan Maluku (FKM, Malukan
Sovereign Front) on 15 June 2000 and actively promoted Malukan
independence in the months that followed, as a panacea to the
increasing sectarian violence.30 By 27 June, President Wahid was moved
to announce a Civil Emergency.31 The Pattimura commander-in-chief
was shifted from Max Tamaela to I Made Yasa. In response to
international criticism and pressure, the security forces then attempted
to counter the Muslim domination of  the conflict by deploying Yon
Gabungan (special alliance forces), which consisted of special forces
commandoes drawn from the military and the police. The special forces
began duties on 22 September 2000, and proceeded to attack Laskar
Jihad bases in Ambon, resulting in the deaths of  a number of  Muslims.32
–––––––––––––––––
university student regiment members. See, ICG, Indonesia: the Search for Peace in Maluku;
“Pelatihnya Menwa, Alumni Mujahidin, Moro & Kashmir, An interview with Ja’far
Umar Thalib”, Xpos. No. 13/ III, 17-23 April 2000, 4; Greg Fealy, “Inside the Laskar
Jihad”, Inside Indonesia, January – March 2001.
28 Lambang Trijono, Keluar dari Kemelut Maluku: Refleksi Pengalaman Praktis Bekerja
untuk Perdamaian Maluku, (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2001), p.61.
29 Ibid, p. 63.
30 M. Husni Putuhena, Mengungkap Misteri Konflik di Maluku, (Ambon: Pengurus
Besar Front Pembela Islam Maluku, 2001), p. 82.
31 Lambang Trijono,  Keluar dari Kemelut Maluku, p. 64.
32 Ayip Syafruddin and Eko Prasetyo, Tragedi Kebun Cengkeh Fakta Pembantaian
Paramedis, Pasien & Warga Sipil Ambon, (Jakarta: Jihad Press, 2002).
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The ascendancy of military forces after the civil emergency was
declared reduced the conflict, though it continued on a smaller scale.
Forced religious conversion began to be used by the Muslims. For
instance, after an attack on the Christian community at Kesui Island
in Eastern Seram in November 2000 in which 54 people were killed,
some 655 Christians were forced to convert and become Muslims.33
On 11 December 2001, eighty Christians died when a ferry vessel, the
California, was bombed. Ambonese Christians responded to this
incident by burning the provincial parliament building.
By 2002 however, the conflict began to wane. The central
government sponsored negotiations led by the Co-coordinating Minister
for People’s Welfare, Jusuf  Kalla, which led to the Malino II peace
agreement in February 2002. The agreement stipulated an end to all
violence as well as the banning and disarming of  militias. The joint
commissions created under the agreement would also monitor
compliance and oversee economic recovery. The weariness on both
sides of the intense and prolonged fighting explains the readiness to
reach an agreement so speedily. Indeed, neither Muslims nor Christians
responded emotionally when there were further incidents. For example,
on 28 April 2002, the burning of the Soya village left twelve Christians
dead.34 On 27 July 2002 a bombing in the Mardika market left one
Christian dead and fifty injured.35 In September 2002, three young
–––––––––––––––––
33 KPMM,  Laporan Kerja Komisi Penyelidik Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia dan
Mediasi di Maluku 19 Januari 2000 - 18 December 2000, p. 28.
34 The Soya is a mountainous region, about three hours walking distance from
Ambon city. It was difficult for ordinary people to be involved in an attack on such a
region. The victims, who survived this incident, came to the conclusion that members
of the Special Armed Forces in cooperation with Laskar Jihad paramilitary groups were
involved in the attack. They listened to the attackers’ Javanese accents and observed
their obvious military skills (An interviw with Johanes, Ambon, 2 August 2002).
Before the incident, the Laskar Jihad seemed to have been coordinating their own attack
agenda in consultation with members of the Special Armed Forces and other security
groups, without involving ordinary Ambonese Muslims (An interview with Abdulgani
Fabanyo, Ambon, 18 August 2002).
35 The bomb went off just a few hundred metres away from where I was
standing when interviewing Christians near the Citra supermarket. Christians screamed
‘Acang…Acang (Muslims…Muslims!…)’.  Christians were alleging that Muslims had
planted this bomb. I saw a group of  Special Armed Forces personnel save a person
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athletes died in the vicinity of the Mardika Court. In these incidents,
both Muslims and Christians realised that there were outside actors
involved in trying to prolong the conflict.
E. The Response of the Local Muslims
The arrival of the Laskar Jihad resulted in the division of local
Muslims into two groups: local radical groups, which inherited the
religious radicalism of the Laskar Jihad, and the dominant moderate
Muslim group, which to some extent was opposed to the mission of
the Laskar Jihad and was prepared to cooperate with the government
in seeking a peaceful solution. These factions had an impact on the
dynamics of inter-Muslim relationships and on inter-faith and inter-
ethnic reconciliation.
The first impact of the coming of the Laskar Jihad was a growth
in Islamic radicalism among local Ambonese Muslims. There were two
main radical organisations in Ambon. One was the FPIM (Front Pembela
Islam Maluku), chaired by Husni Putuhena. The second was the task
force of the Amar Makruf Nahi Mungkar (AMNM, Enjoining Right
Forbidding Evil) under the leadership of  Muhammad At-Tamimy, who
is of Arab descent and who enjoyed widespread public support after
Muslims became dominant in the middle of 2000. The FPIM gave
intellectual support to radical Muslims through their role at Muslim
rallies and in political activities against the local government and
Christians.
The AMNM recruited local Muslims as paramilitary members,
who then received paramilitary training from the Laskar Jihad and
teaching in the doctrines of Islam.  Local Muslims indicated that: ‘the
Laskar Jihad taught us (local Muslims) how to use an Islamic ethic in
the conflict, in killing, burning and terrorising Christians’.36 Ustaz
Dzulqarnain, a leading teacher in the FKAWJ, stated that Muslims had
a requirement before attacking and killing Christians: it was compulsory
to teach Christians and persuade them to convert to Islam and it was
–––––––––––––––––
(alleged to be Muslim) by using an Acang (Muslim) public car. However, Christians
then realised that this person was a police intelligence officer, who operated in the
Mardika market area (Ambon, a fieldwork note, 28 July 2002).
36 An interview with Irwan Patty, Ambon, 10 August 2002.
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forbidden to kill women and children.37 Such teaching concerning war
changed the nature of  the local Muslims’ religiosity. They gained a
confidence and belief that attacking and killing Christians was legal
under Islamic law.38
The moderate Muslims, on the other hand, opposed to the
doctrines of the Laskar Jihad. A counter-movement began with the
foundation of the BIMM (Badan Imarat Muslim Maluku) in 2001, chaired
by Ali Fauzy, an Ambonese Muslim leader who had attended the Jakarta
rally in April 2000 with Rustam Kastor to seek Muslim support in
Java. The BIMM wanted to unite Muslim groups in Maluku to help
stop the continuing violence and support reconciliation with Christians.
Those involved in BIMM also represented those who are traditional
Sunni adherents, different from the radical Salafy tradition of the Laskar
Jihad.  The Laskar Jihad predictably criticized the BIMM, describing it
as ‘a product of government design’ in Maluku.39
The surprising success of the Malino II peace agreement
demonstrated that local Ambonese Muslims had supported the Laskar
Jihad in order to secure their lives against the perceived threat of the
Christians and the separatist RMS. However, the violent activities of
the Laskar Jihad had also become an embarrassment to Indonesia. Hours
before the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002, the Laskar Jihad was
officially disbanded in Jakarta. According to its legal adviser, this was
due to internal divisions over policy and ideology, in particular, Thalib’s
approach to waging Jihad. Its parent organization, the FKAWJ, has
continued to carry out its social and educational activities on Java.40 In
Maluku, the Laskar Jihad warriors thus returned to Java after the
disbandment. Without this interference from the radical organization,
local Ambonese Muslims were able to find release from their fears and
–––––––––––––––––
37 Salafy, no. 36, 2001 (19).
38 An interview with Irwan Patty, 10 August 2002.
39 An interview with Ustaz Ali Fauzy, Ambon, 27 July 2002. Ustaz Ali Fauzy is
one of Malukan origins attended National Muslim Meeting in Jakarta in January 2000,
and spoke the importance for Jihad to Maluku to fight against Christians. Fauzy
welcomed Laskar Jihad to Maluku in 2000, but later opposed Salafy teaching influence
to local Sunny Muslims.
40 Andrew T H Tan, A Political and Economic Dictionary in Southeast Asia, (London:
Routledge, 2004), p.156.
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burdens by working towards reconciliation with their Christian
counterparts.
F. The Response of Christians
The response of the Christian community gathered pace from
early 2000 onwards, especially after the arrival of the Laskar Jihad in
Maluku. Early on, Muslims perceived the Jihad to be against Christians
who had attacked Muslims. A few months after the arrival of  the Laskar
Jihad, however, the focus of the Jihad or holy war changed from one
against Christians to one against the separatist RMS (Republic of South
Maluku) movement. Muslims assumed that the separatist agenda had
support in the wider Christian community. However, many Christians
in fact did not support this, viewing the Maluku Sovereign Front (Front
Kedaulatan Maluku or FKM) led by Alex Manuputty as being one of
those responsible for inflaming sentiments between the Christian and
Muslim communities.
When the FKM was first founded, it did attract significant support
from Christians, who saw it as a moral movement criticising the central
government, which had failed to solve the conflict. After the arrival of
the Laskar Jihad, the Christians felt compelled to seek international
intervention to solve the ongoing conflict. In August 2000, therefore,
Alex Manuputty campaigned against human rights violations in Maluku
by appealing to the United States.41 After returning from the USA,
however, Manuputty’s approach became more political. He opposed
the central government by asserting that Maluku ought to be separated
from Indonesia, on the grounds that Maluku was illegally taken over
by the Sukarno government in the 1950s.42
With the failure of the central government in banning the
activities of the Laskar Jihad in Maluku, and the rise in number of
Christian victims during 2000, solidarity among Christians grew. As a
consequence, Christian fundamentalism increased and made the
–––––––––––––––––
41 Radical Malukan Muslims criticized Tomagola’s record as a representative during
the campaign. They claimed that Tomagola did not know about what happened in
Maluku (An interview with Irwan Patty, 10 August 2002).
42 An interview with Johanes, a Christian and human right activist, Ambon,
July 2002.
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conflict more severe in 2000 than it was in 1999. There were groups
that played an important role in the growth of this fundamentalism, in
particular, those who had played key roles in defending the Christians
against Muslims in 2000. Agus Watimena, the leader of  the Coker
(Cowok-Cowok Kristen, Christian Boys),43 a gang based in Kudamati
claimed that: ‘this is a real religious war and we have to protect
ourselves. Sometimes protection means attacking first. We have a plan,
and when the time comes, we will wipe them out’.44 The growth of
such extremist groups however, merely exacerbated the conflict.
The Christian Laskar Kristus paramilitary group was formed during
the early stages of the conflict, but this movement gained significant
momentum after the destruction of  the Silo church, the oldest church
in Ambon, on December 1999. Agus Wattimena led the paramilitaries
until his death on 22 March 2001, after which Emang Nikijuluw, Semmy
Souissa and Melkianus Yusuf  Tuhumury led the militia groups. The
Christian groups consisted of 25 small divisions of 100-200 militant
members in the city of  Ambon and in the neighbouring islands. 60 per
cent of members were estimated to be between 12 and 25 years old,
with a few women members.45 They used traditional arms such as
knives, machetes, poisoned arrows, homemade guns and small numbers
of  automatic weapons obtained from corrupt police.46
G. The Response of  the NGOs and Local Government
There have been attempts at reconciliation since the early stages
of the conflict in Ambon. They have some common features: both
local and central governments have made on-going attempts to initiate
reconciliation with the involvement of both civil leaders and military
officers. There have been the grassroots-level involvements of  local,
–––––––––––––––––
43 The Coker was originally a gangster group called Cowok-Cowok Keren (Handsome
Boys), but after the conflict they renamed it Cowok-Cowok Kristen. The change in name
was important and was intended to foster Christian solidarity against Muslims during
the conflict. A discussion with Christian youths in Ambon, July 2002.
44 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku,
(Jakarta/ Brussels: ICG Asia Report No. 10, 2000), p. 15.
45 Kirsten E. Schulze, “Laskar Jihad and the Conflict in Ambon”, p. 63.
46 Ibid., p. 63-64.
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national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
as well as attempts by Ambonese themselves to resolve the situation
in their local communities.
These features can be divided into two patterns: top-down and
bottom-up initiatives - each with their strengths and weaknesses. This
essay argues that in the case of reconciliation in Ambon, neither the
government nor the NGOs on their own have been successful. Both
are needed.
The first local government initiative toward reconciliation
involved the formation of  the ‘Team Six’ (Tim Enam). It was formed
at the end of January 1999 and was given the task of investigating the
January 1999 conflict and seeking ways to resolve the issues arising
from it. It comprised both Muslim and Christian representatives:
Thamrin Elly, Luthfy Sanaky, John Ruhulesin, M.G. Lailosa, Bruno
Rumyaru, and Condratus Ufie.47 With the escalation of  conflict, it was
found necessary to expand this group to make it more representative
and include local bureaucrats, religious leaders, military leaders, adat
chiefs and others in the local elite.
This new team was given the name Pusat Rujuk Social (PRS, the
Social Reconciliation Centre). In its early stages, the team was able to
successfully look after mosques, churches and other places where there
was potential for violence. It set about analysing the roots of the
conflict, formulating a reconciliation process, creating suburban security
patrol posts, consolidating management of negeri-negeri (village areas)
and ran seminars and workshops discussing the roots of conflict.48
The PRS initiated a reconciliation treaty at the Merdeka Square,
Ambon on 12 May 1999. Religious leaders, heads of the local
communities, youth leaders and other grassroots Muslims and
Christians, signed the agreement.49 However, this agreement was a top-
–––––––––––––––––
47 Lambang Trijono, Keluar dari Kemelut Maluku, p. 136.
48 Ibid., p. 137.
49 The pact was signed by R.R. Hasanusi (MUI chief), Pdt. S.P. Titaley (the chief
of  Sinode GPM, Protestant Church), Mgr. Joseph Tethol (Uskup Dioses  Amboina, Catholic
Church), Hussein Tuasikal (Remaja Masjid, chief  of  Mosque Youth), Ferry Nahusona
(Angkatan Muda GPM, GPM Youth), FR Simon P Matruty (Catholic Youth ), RE
Latuconsina (Latupati (head) of sub-district (kecamatan) of Saparua islands), AL Loilosa
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down agreement, which was not understood by the grassroots, who
were largely concerned for their safety and that of  their communities.
The team ceased to exist after the second period of the conflict began
in July 1999. It was seen by the grassroots as a government body, which
was unable to effectively probe the roots of the conflict because of its
top-down approach. The Muslim and Christian communities felt they
could not rely on this approach.
The next government initiative was the ‘Team Twenty-four’,
which was initially formed to ensure the protection of  President Wahid
and his Cabinet during their visit to Ambon in December 1999. It
began by distributing some thirty thousand pamphlets to communities
in both Muslim and Christian regions, dropping them by army helicopter
on 7 December 1999.  These pamphlets outlined the Deklarasi Menahan
Diri (Restrain Oneself Declaration), which stated:
Towards the coming holy month of  Ramadhan and Idul Fitri 1 Syawal
1420 H., Christmas (25 December 1999) and New Year 2000, people
are expected to refrain from activities, which might instigate violence.
Therefore, people are not to hold mass gatherings, nor to fabricate
irresponsible rumours … nor to shoot, bomb or other similar activities,
which would stir up mass feelings … and to immediately form security
patrol posts (Indo. Pos Keamanan Masyarakat) in each neighbourhood
[to calm the local population, give them a sense of security and a sense
of their participation in ensuring their security].50
The statement was intended to calm the emotions of both
communities before the arrival of  President Wahid and Vice-President
Megawati on 12 December 1999. However, the temporary peace
–––––––––––––––––
(Latupati of sub-district Amahai), Corputy (Latupati  of sub-district Kairatu), Pellu
(the king of Hitu Lama), Abdul Aziz Abide (Association of South Sulawesi Families),
La Hamsidi (Association of Southeast Sulawesi Family) and Ngurah Nyoman
Wiandnyana (Bali Community). MUI, 2000: 173, Appendix 1; Kopim (Kelompok
Pembela Islam Maluku, the Islamic Defenders of Maluku), 2000 Himpunan Naskah
Resmi Disampaikan Kepada: Presiden RI K.H. Abd. Rahman Wahid Pada Pertemuan Dengan
Tokoh Muslim Maluku Tanggal 2 September 2000  di Istana Negara (The Compilation of
Official Papers Prepared for the Indonesian Republic President Abd. Rahman Wahid
For His Meeting with Malukan Muslim Leaders on 2 September 2000 in the State
Palace). Ambon, Kopim.
50 Crisis Centre Keuskupan Amboina, 2002: 9; translation mine.
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prevailed until 19 December 1999 when conflict again broke out in
Kampung Java, Ambon. Four people were killed and eight were seriously
injured.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), both at a local and
national level, played a pivotal role in reconciliation attempts. The
growth in the number of  NGOs was enormous, from under fifty before
the conflict to more than four hundred during the conflict.51 This growth
can be seen as a consequence of a growth in civil society activity in
Ambon during the conflict. The NGOs saw reconciliation as a long-
term process. Two examples of  successful NGO outcomes were the
Wayame regional self-protection units and the TIRUS (Tim Relawan
Untuk Kemanusiaan, The Voluntary Teams for Humanity) initiated by
12 NGOs. However, the NGOs were not able to make contact with
the radical Muslim and Christian groups, which were involved in
mobilising the communities for battle.
The religious and social leaders of  the village of  Wayame took
the initiative in forming the ‘Team Twenty of  Wayame’. It was founded
in February 1999 to protect the region of  Wayame from attack and
from influences stemming from conflict in other regions. The team
successfully protected their community (Muslims and Christians) from
outside influence. The Wayame team conducted intensive dialogue,
prayers for peace and encouraged respect for each other, assisted both
the Muslim and Christian communities. From this experience, it can in
fact be concluded that the Ambon conflict was not purely a religious
conflict, but was instigated by outsiders.52 However, the team continued
to function only until May 2000 when outsiders mounted a full attack
on Wayame.53
The Yayasan Baileo (Baileo Foundation) also founded TIRUS in
conjunction with 12 NGOs on 2 February 1999. It attempted to
coordinate local NGOs with the support of national and international
funding organisations. It aimed to strengthen local organisations and
–––––––––––––––––
51 An interview with Jefferson Tasik, Ambon, August 2002. Tasik is a director
of Balieo Foundation, one of the oldest NGOs in Maluku.
52 An interview with Tony Pariela, Ambon, 31 July 2002. Pariela is a senior
lecturer at Pattimura University, Ambon.
53 Lambang Trijono, Keluar dari Kemelut Maluku, p. 144.
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communities in moving towards reconciliation, in rebuilding social ties
and helping to support the victims of the conflict. The Baileo
Foundation founded volunteer networks in both Muslim and Christian
communities. It attempted to help people recover psychologically from
what had happened, providing counselling for women, children and
disabled victims of the conflict in both Muslim and Christian regions
in Ambon, Central Maluku and Southeast Maluku.
After the failure of local government to bring about
reconciliation in 1999, local government officials tried again in 2000,
establishing a team called Tim Fasilitator Pemda (The Regional
Government Facilitator team). On 14 January 2000, Governor Saleh
Latuconsina released a statement announcing the formation of
reconciliation teams among villages all over the Ambonese islands.
These teams had the job of implementing a program of reconciliation,
which was to function at the village level.54 These local government
approaches, however, were ineffective because of a dispute between
the civil government and the security and police forces as to who was
really in charge during the civil emergency after June 2000.
H. Response of  the Central Government
In addition, the central government also undertook a number of
initiatives. President Wahid gave to Vice-President Megawati the task
of coordinating the efforts of the Coordinating Ministers from the
Ministry of  Politics and Security, Ministry of  Religious Affairs, and
Ministry for Social Welfare and Poverty Eradication in initiating a long-
term program for reconciliation from January 2000. However, this
central government initiative, though ambitious, ran into problems
because of the difficulty in getting the executive members to work
with each other. This was the result of  friction between the Vice-
President and President and between other leading figures in the central
government.
Under President Megawati’s leadership, the Coordinating Minister
for People’s Welfare, Jusuf  Kalla, played a mediating role at a meeting
between opposing Christian and Muslim factions in Malino, South
–––––––––––––––––
54 Ibid., p. 138-9.
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Sulawesi, on 11-12 February 2002. They reached an agreement called
Maluku agreement of  Malino II (Tomagola, 2002). At this meeting,
thirty-five Muslim and thirty-five Christian government officers,
political leaders, heads of villages, and Muslim and Christian
community leaders agreed to sign an 11-point joint declaration.
Amongst its key provisions were: (1) To end all conflict and
violence (2) to abide by the due process of law which is to be enforced
fairly (3) to reject and oppose all kinds of separatist movements,
including aspirations for a Republic of South Maluku (RMS) (4) the
people of Maluku would have the right to stay and work legally
anywhere in the Republic of Indonesia, so long as they respected the
local culture, and observed law and order, (5) to ban and disarm illegal
armed organizations, groups, or militias, in accordance with the existing
law; outsider parties that disturb the peace in Maluku will be expelled
from Maluku, (6) to establish a national independent investigation team
to investigate, for example, the tragic incident on 19 January 1999,
and the involvement of  Maluku Sovereign Front (Front Kedaulatan
Maluku-FKM), Republic of South Maluku (Republik Maluku Selatan-
RMS), Christian Republic of South Maluku (Kristen Republik Maluku
Selatan-Kristen RMS), Jihad warriors (Laskar Jihad) and Christ Warriors
(Laskar Kristus).55
Radical Muslim groups argued that the Malino II declaration was
one-sided, as it did not involve them in the process of reconciliation.
They argued that Muslims at the meeting were not representative of
Malukan Muslims and that there were some Christians in the meeting,
whom they claim were involved in separatist activities and the mass
killing of Malukan Muslims during the early stages of the conflict.56
According to Pariela, the head of Christian delegation at Malino
II, the radical Muslim groups had in fact been invited, but these groups
had said that they would only join the meeting if all kapitan (leaders)
–––––––––––––––––
55 Tamrin Amal Tomagola, Seminar on the Moluccan Communal Conflict, a working
paper for Indonesia Study Group, Canberra, the Australian National University, 12 July
2002.
56 An interview with Ustaz Muhammad At-Tamimy, Ambon, August 2002.
At-Tamimy becomes a rector of  State Islamic University few years after conflict, and has
facilitated religious dialogues through his university.
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2008 M/1429 H
Badrus Sholeh
94
of the Muslim security patrol posts (about a hundred people) were
involved in the meeting and if they were able to screen members of
the Christian delegation to exclude RMS activists. Pariela’s view was
that this was an irrational approach to take as part of a process of
working towards reconciliation.57
The Malino II agreement became the key to further reconciliation
steps in Ambon covering the broader issues. The agreement sparked a
process not just in terms of  dialogue but also in the search for political
and economic solutions acceptable to both communities. NGOs came
to have a prominent role in this reconciliation process, helping not just
as a bridge  between the Muslim and Christian communities but also
acting as a bridge between the government and the local community.
The NGOs were able to reach a broad cross-section of people,
from ordinary citizens to those who had actually participated in the
violence. In the Muslim regions, the Malukan branch of the Lakpesdam
NU (Lembaga Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia Nahdlatul Ulama, the
NU Institute for Human Resources Development), an NGO under
the biggest Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, played a significant
role in accommodating the views of grassroots Muslims in reaching a
peaceful solution. The Lakpesdam NU made available psychological
treatment for young local Muslims, who had been directly involved in
the war against Christians, and facilitated dialogue between them and
their Christian counterparts.
I. Jihad After 9/11 and Future Challenges
As described above, Laskar Jihad forces returned to Java and
disbanded shortly after the Bali bombing in October 2002. After that,
a general stability descended upon Maluku, although systematic
violence has continued, with a number of  unexplained killings.
This has been attributed to the Laskar Mujahidin, a radical Muslim
network that is the product of the radicalisation of local Muslims as a
result of the activities of radical activists from outside Maluku. The
network comprises of Mujahidin Kompak (consisting of those
discontented with the Malino II accord), former members of  the Darul
–––––––––––––––––
57 An interview with Tony Pariela, Ambon, 31 July 2002.
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Islam (supporters of the idea of an Indonesian Islamic State) and the
Al Qaeda-linked Jama’ah Islamiah group active in Maluku and Poso.58
The group has attacked government forces, such as the operation against
the police camp in Loki on 16 May 2005, which killed five police, a
Loki Christian, and also led to the deaths of two Laskar Mujahidin
members.  More than fifteen Mujahidin members were later jailed for
the attacks.59 The association with the Jema’ah Islamiah and such violent
activities against the state indicate that the network is linked to the
problem of wider regional terrorism.
Laskar Mujahidin was founded soon after the early Muslim-
Christian clash in Maluku in 1999. The Muslim organization in Java,
the Dewan Dakwah Islamiah Indonesia, had mobilised groups to
support Muslims from the threat of  the Christians. This group then
became the KOMPAK Foundation, which initially undertook
humanitarian operation in Maluku and Poso beginning in 1999. This
evolved into the Laskar Mujahidin, which, like the Laskar Jihad, took
part in combat operations in Maluku. Unlike the latter, however, Laskar
Mujahidin prefers to move and attack in small groups, comprising about
10-15 people. According to Ambonese Muslims, Mujahidin forces were
more strategically placed and had a greater impact compared to Laskar
Jihad forces60
The Laskar Mujahidin network in Maluku has operations at the
district level. Each district level post is chaired by a local commander,
–––––––––––––––––
58 Fieldwork notes in Ambon, 28 September 2005, and in Poso, 19 May 2005.
Cahyono, a Police officer of  Polda Maluku confirmed this picture. Cahyono is a Police
investigator of Loki case and its connection with previous attacks by Mujahidin forces.
An interview with Cahyono, Ambon, 30 September 2005.
59 The Loki attackers (and planners) were Asep Jaja (Ciamis, West Java), Ongen
Pattimura (Luhu, West Ceram), Fathur (a Javanese married an Ambonese), Abdullah
Umamity (Buru, Ambon), Ikhlas (a Javanese, killed), Ismail Fahmi Yamlehu (an
Ambonese Police, deserter), Zainuddin Nasir (Batusangkar, West Sumatra, a commander
of Mujahidin STAIN), Abu Zar (a Buginese of Poso), Jodi (a Buginese of Poso),
Mukhlis and Ustaz Arsyad @ Azad (a Javanese); An interview with local leaders in
Ketapang and Loki on 28 September 2005, and with some Police investigators in
Ambon, 28 and 30 September 2005.
60 Interview with Abdul Ghani Fabanyo in Kebon Cengkeh, 25 September
2005.
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except in Air Kuning where Ustaz Arsyad, a Javanese graduated from
Al-Mukmin Ngruki in 2001, became a commander in Maluku in 2004-
2005. The group has a systematic mode of operation, with planners,
financial supporters and executors.
The continued presence of such radicalized groups and
individuals, coupled with the bitterness generated by the conflict,
indicate the potential for the Maluku conflict to emerge again at some
point in the future.
Government, civil society and security forces have continued
their attempts at peace building in Maluku under the financial support
of  national and international agencies. Coser has optimistically argued
that the contending parties of the conflict will reduce their activities
after reaching a collective accord of peace and development.61  In
Maluku, each ethno-religious group is aware of the need for unity in
ensuring Malukan development.
However, there remain serious challenges, such as the plight of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the threat of Laskar Mujahidin
forces. In 2005, several thousands of  IDPs were still staying in
emergency barracks, as emergency funds were siphoned off by a few
corrupt government officers. The situation is mirrored in the plight of
the IDPs in Poso, Central Sulawesi.
More seriously, Laskar Mujahidin members have continued to
carry out Jihad in Maluku. From 2004 to-date, they have carried out a
series of  terror attacks against Christians and the security forces. From
August 2004 to April 2005, for instance, they killed a Christian priest
in Burru islands, bombed Christian regions in Ambon and planned an
abortive attack on Malukan Christians around the anniversary of the
RMS on 25 April 2005. However, Indonesian army and police have
since successfully secured the region.62  However, the Laskar Mujahidin
attack in Loki in May 2005 indicates that the Laskar Mujahidin group
remains a serious security challenge for the Indonesian security forces.
Given its regional links, meeting this challenge will require stronger
–––––––––––––––––
61 Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul LTD, 1972), p. 112.
62 An interview with Drs Leonidas Braksan, MBA, a Head of  Police in Ambon
and Lease islands, Ambon, 28 September 2005.
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security cooperation not only in Indonesia but also internationally
through the ASEAN and Asia Pacific security networks.
This essay has argued that the impact of the Laskar Jihad militia
group has been prominent, and that outside forces were responsible in
large part for the scale and sustenance of the violence in Maluku. The
local community, both Muslim and Christian, largely prefer to negotiate
their differences in a peaceful manner, but the Laskar Jihad has
unfortunately left a legacy of local radicalized groups that will continue
to pose a serious security challenge for some time to come.
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